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This article explores the ways that mothers and children from primarily middle-income 
European American backgrounds reason about events in which biological and 
nonbiological objects change in size. In Study 1, mother–child conversations were 
examined to investigate the events mothers described as growth, as well as the ways 
mothers explained events occurring in different domains. Findings indicate that although 
mothers primarily discussed events in domain-specific ways, they exhibited some 
domain blurring in their talk to children. In Study 2,3-year-old children (M = 3 years, 2 
months) and 5-year-old children (M = 5 years) provided descriptions and explanations of 
the same events. Results suggest that preschool children have begun to develop 
domain-specific understandings. Results are discussed in light of the role that social 
interaction plays in children’s conceptual development. 
With the purpose of characterizing early thought, many researchers have closely examined 
children’s understanding of core areas of knowledge identified by adults, such as psychology 
(e.g., Gopnik & Wellman, 1994), physics (e.g., Carey & Spelke, 1994), and biology (e.g., 
Hatano & Inagaki, 1994). This body of work has yielded valuable information regarding what 
children know about particular objects and events and when this knowledge  becomes 
differentiated by domain. Largely unanswered, however, is the question of how children come 
to their domain-specific understandings (Coley, 2000; Gauvain, 2001; Wellman & Gelman, 
1998). 
In this article we focus on social interaction as a potential mechanism of conceptual 
development. As children attempt to make sense of their world, they are likely to do so in the 
context of social activity. Although domain distinctions in everyday phenomena may be readily 
apparent to adults, an open question is whether and how these differences come to be noticed 
by children. One possibility is that adults might differentiate by domain in the ways they talk 
with children about a variety of events. It is also possible, however, that adults may not consis-
tently talk about events in domain-specific ways. 
As an example, consider the multiple ways the concept of growth is used in our culture. In 
addition to the biological sense of the word grow, (“the  flowers are growing”), children 
might hear people say that “the economy is growing,” or they may see crystal-growing kits in 
their local toy store. And while reading Lewis Carroll’s Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland, they 
may notice that the caterpillar tells Alice, “One side will make you grow taller, and the other will 
make you grow shorter.” It is clear from these examples that the English language allows for 
flexible uses of certain concepts and, as Keil (1994) pointed out, “true definitions are rare 
occurrences in word meanings.” Thus, although growth is perhaps most commonly thought of as 
a critical biological process, there are many other possible applications of the concept. Little is 
known about the extent to which children encounter semantic ambiguity in their interactions 
with others, or whether such ambiguity influences children’s conceptual development. 
In the present studies we focus on preschool  children’s developing theories with two 
primary goals. First, we explore mother–child conversations as a context within which 
children may have opportunities to distinguish biology as a separate domain. Second, we 
examine children’s explanations of real-world events that are structurally equivalent in some 
surface respects yet fall into different  domains (biological, nonbiological natural, artifact). 
The ability to distinguish biological from non-biological kinds has been central to recent 
debates over whether young children possess intuitive biological theories distinct from their 
theories of other domains. Past work has shown that children as young as 3 years of age 
distinguish between living kinds and artifacts in the causes they consider  appropriate to 
explain events (Gelman & Gottfried, 1996; Hatano & Inagaki,1994; Springer & Keil,1991). Children 
are particularly adept at making the living kind–artifact distinction when asked about familiar 
biological properties such as eating and growth (Inagaki & Hatano, 1996). 
In this article we focus on how mothers and children invoke the concept of growth, as 
this concept seems to be central to children’s emerging biological theories (Inagaki & Hatano, 
1996). To date, studies exploring children’s understanding of  growth have focused on their 
judgments of the potential for animals, plants, and human-made artifacts to grow. 
Rosengren, Gelman, Kalish, and McCormick (1991), for example, demonstrated that children as 
young as 3 years of age knew that animals grow and that nonliving things do not grow. Inagaki 
& Hatano (1996) extended this work to a broader range of living kinds and found that 4-yearold 
children also attribute growth to plants (see also Backsheider, Shatz, & Gelman, 1993). This finding 
suggests that children’s reasoning about the potential for growth centers around whether an 
object is alive rather than whether it is animate. 
Other researchers have found that children not only honor domain distinctions in their 
judgments about growth but they also know something about the processes involved in growth. 
Inagaki & Hatano (1987) found that 5-year-olds understand that living things do not grow because 
one wants them to (i.e., by human desire) but grow because of specific  biological processes 
(e.g., eating, getting water). Also, Hickling and Gelman (1995) demonstrated that by 4 years 
of age children understand that seeds grow because of certain natural mechanisms (e.g., rain, 
sunshine). These studies suggest that growth seems to be a concept that preschool children know 
a lot about, leading some researchers to suggest that growth “may constitute the core of young 
children’s concept of living things” (Inagaki & Hatano, 1996,  p. 2825). 
The existing work, however, fails to explore fully the extent of children’s knowledge about 
growth for several reasons. First, many of these studies relied on forced-choice tasks that may 
overestimate children’s tendency to differentiate by domain in the types of explanatory processes 
they use. For example, Backsheider et al. (1993) asked children to judge whether damaged animals, 
plants, and artifacts could heal through regrowth or whether a person could repair them. 
Children differentiated by domain in the causes they selected, attributing the possibility  
for regrowth only to plants and animals. It is  not clear from these findings, however, 
whether children would differentiate by domain as clearly if asked to generate their own 
explanations for these events. 
A second problem with current work lies in the items selected by many researchers to 
investigate domain differences in children’s judgments of  growth. Rosengren et al. 
(1991), for example, compared questions about whether animals get  bigger over time with 
questions about whether artifacts such as chairs and teapots increase in size over time. 
Although preschool children easily distinguished between these events, it may be premature 
to draw the conclusion that children see growth as a biological concept without also investi-
gating children’s reasoning about artifacts that  actually do get bigger. In their everyday 
lives children are likely to encounter events in which nonbiological objects increase in size 
(e.g., a beach ball being blown up). It is not known whether  children would judge actual 
increases in size of artifacts as growth. 
Another shortcoming of current work, also  related to item selection, is that it has 
focused exclusively on children’s understanding of whether biological kinds and artifacts grow, 
excluding non-biological natural kinds (e.g., Inagaki & Hatano, 1996; Rosengren et al., 
1991). The distinction between biological and nonbiological natural kinds has theoretical 
importance. Both are natural objects; however, only biological kinds are living. Current work has 
often focused on the important conceptual distinction between biological (living) kinds and 
nonliving kinds, but the nonliving kinds studied have been primarily human-made artifacts. In 
one exception, Gelman and Kremer (1991) explored the distinction between natural kinds and 
human-made artifacts, showing that 4-year-old children differentiate natural objects from 
human-made objects in terms of their explanations of origins. In this study, however, living and 
nonliving natural kinds were grouped together. Little is known about whether children 
understand changes in size in different ways depending on whether the object undergoing 
change is a living thing, a nonliving natural-kind object, or an artifact. 
In the present research we aim to clarify the preceding issues by exploring participants’ 
explanations of and talk about events in which objects from three ontological categories change in 
size (biological kinds, nonbiological natural kinds, and human-made artifacts). In addition, 
the use of an open-ended task encourages participants to talk about depicted events in an 
unconstrained manner. Thus, both the design and the methodology of this study will broaden 
our knowledge of children’s understanding of real-world events. 
In addition to contributing to knowledge about children’s domain-specific understandings, we 
also investigate how children come to understand the world in domain-specific ways. The 
process by which children advance their understandings is  often discussed in terms of 
children’s active attempts to make sense of the world through self-directed exploration and 
experimentation (e.g., Carey & Spelke, 1994; Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1997). Recent sociocultural 
views, in contrast, have emphasized the significance of the social and cultural contexts within 
which children negotiate their understandings (e.g., Rogoff, 1990). In particular, conversations 
with family members may be an important context in which young children begin to develop and 
refine their intuitive understandings. 
Despite increasing recognition of the value of studies that examine family discourse as it 
relates to theory development (Inagaki & Hatano, 1996; Wellman & Gelman, 1998), very little 
work has focused on the content of parent speech to children as it  relates to children’s 
developing theories of biology (in contrast to work on mother–child conversation and 
children’s theory-of-mind development; e.g., Bartsch & Wellman, 1995; Ruffman, Slade, & 
Crowe, 2002; Sabbagh & Callanan, 1998). One exception is a study by Gelman, Coley, Rosengren, 
Hartman, and Pappas (1998) in which mother–child dyads were asked to read a picture book 
designed to elicit talk about animal and artifact categories. Findings  revealed that mothers 
tended to stick to labeling objects and providing generic category information (e.g., “dogs 
bark’’), rarely offering causal explanations to their children. Several other studies suggest, 
however, that important conversations about causality may be more prevalent outside of book-
reading settings (Beals, 1993; Crowley et al., 2001; Snow & Kurland, 1996). Such conversations 
may support intuitive theory development, particularly if parents reserve certain types of 
explanations for events occurring in certain domains. In this study, we examine whether 
parents, in conversation with their children, talk in ways that might help children  recognize 
the domain-specific nature of certain causal processes. 
In sum, the present studies contribute to the  literature on parent–child conversations, as 
well as to the literature on children’s biological understanding. In Study 1, we provide 
information about how mothers discuss biological and nonbiological events with their children. 
In Study 2, we present new evidence regarding children’s understanding of  growth and 
their explanations of biological and nonbiological changes in size. The results of this research 
add to our understanding of what children know and shed light on how social interactions may 
contribute to children’s emerging theories. 
Study 1 
In our first study, we examine the ways mothers talk with children about various increases and 
decreases in size to gain insight into the potential role mothers may play in children’s developing 
understanding of biological and nonbiological phenomena. Because prior work has demonstrated 
that preschool children attribute growth to living but not nonliving objects, we pay particular 
attention to whether mothers of preschool children talk about growth strictly  for 
biological changes, or whether they demonstrate flexibility in the changes they identify as 
growth. In addition, we look at the explanations mothers provide for events occurring in 
different domains. 
Method 
Participants 
Thirty-six mother–child pairs participated. The sample was divided evenly into two groups 
based on child’s age: 3-year-olds (M = 3 years, 2 months; range = 2 years, 7 months to 3 years, 11 
months) and 4
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2-year-olds (M = 4 years, 7 months; range = 4 years, 1 month to 4 years, 11 months). 
There were an equal number of boys and girls in each group. Mothers were mainly from 
middle-income European American backgrounds and all were native English  speakers. 
Participants were recruited through local child care centers in a coastal region of Northern 
California; they participated voluntarily and were given a children’s book as a thank-you gift. 
Materials 
Ten picture sets depicting physical change-of state events were used. Each set consisted of a 
series of three pictures in sequence, for example, a deflated beachball, a slightly more full 
beachball, and a blown-up beachball. Eight of the items depicted differed by domain 
(biological, artifact) and direction of change (increasing, decreasing). Thus, two items depicted 
biological increases, two depicted biological decreases, two depicted artifact increases, and two 
depicted artifact decreases. We included two additional events depicting the actual and 
apparent increase in size of natural-kind objects that are not alive (these items are henceforth 
referred to as natural-kind items). Within each category, we deliberately selected an 
assortment of items to explore the variety of contexts within which children might hear talk about 
growth and a range of causal mechanisms. By doing so we test the scope of  language use 
by asking parents  to discuss  picture  sets  ranging from the depict ion of  prototypical 
biological growth (e.g., a duck growing) to picture sets  depict ing apparent ,  but  not  
actual, change in size of nonliving natural-kind items (the waxing of the moon). For specific 
items see Table 1. 
Pictures used in 6 of the 10 picture sets were taken from various children’s books; pictures used 
in the remaining 4 sets were photographs taken by the researcher. All picture sets were 
presented in a picture book entitled,  What Happened to the    ?  
Procedure 
All sessions were held in a university laboratory playroom. Upon arriving at the playroom, 
mothers were provided with information regarding the  procedure and were asked for 
informed consent to participate. After a brief free-play period, the picture book activity was 
introduced. Mothers were told that the researchers were interested in how young children and 
their mothers talk about objects and events in the world and were asked to look through the 
picture book with their child in whatever way seemed natural to them. The researcher then left 
the room for the duration of the mother–child session and videotaped their interaction from an 
adjacent room. The average session length was approximately 15 min (range = 9 min to 28 
min). 
Coding 
Reference to growth. Using transcripts and videotapes of the sessions, we first identified 
every instance in which mothers used the word grow (or a variation). We then coded whether 
each instance was an actual description of the depicted event. This step was necessary because we 
found that mothers could talk about growth in several ways. First,  mothers could actually 
describe an event as a growth event (e.g., “The mushroom grew taller”). Second, they could talk 
about growth as being a precursor or antecedent to a depicted event without actually describing 
the depicted change as growth (e.g., in the series of pictures showing a strawberry rotting, “The 
strawberry grew and grew and then it didn’t  get picked so it rotted”). Third, they could mention 
growth in the form of a question (e.g., “Did the  mushroom grow?”). All instances in which 
mothers used the word grow (or a variation) were coded by two independent coders according 
to whether the term was being used as an actual description of the depicted change. Agreement 
on this judgment between two independent coders was 86%. For cases in which coders 
disagreed as to the use of grow, coders jointly reviewed the transcript and videotape and 
came to a mutual conclusion. This tended to be fairly straightforward as disagreements were 
often due to one coder noting an aspect of the utterance overlooked by the other coder, such as 
intonation (e.g., “It grew” versus “It grew?”). In  conducting our analyses, we focused 
exclusively on cases in which mothers were judged to have actually described the depicted event 
as growth.  
[Insert Table 1] 
Explanations. Mothers’ explanations of picture sets were coded to explore whether they 
explained events occurring in different domains in distinct ways. Explanations were coded 
according to the following categories: (a) organic cause: explanations in this category involve the 
mention of processes or factors that adults recognize to be important in biological growth, 
such as food (e.g., “He grew because he ate a lot of food”), water (e.g., “He drank a lot of 
water”), origins (e.g., “It grew from a tiny seed”), and natural environment (e.g., “Mushrooms 
need cool dirt to grow”); (b) human cause: explanations in this category were coded when an event 
was said to be due to human action (e.g., “Someone must have blown it up”); and (c) other: 
explanations in this category included any stated cause for an event, apart from organic and 
human cause, such as the passing of time (e.g., “After it sits for a while it gets smaller”), 
intentions (e.g., “The puffer fish decided to go back to its usual size”), and purpose (e.g., “It 
grew big so we could eat it”). In addition to these explanation codes, we also coded no 
explanation for cases in which no causal mechanisms were suggested for the event. We expected 
mothers to explain biological events with organic cause explanations and artifact events with 
human cause explanations. No predictions based on domain were made for other 
explanations. 
These codes were not mutually exclusive; for example, a participant could explain the 
growth of the mushroom by saying, “Someone gave it water.” This example would be coded 
as both organic and human cause. Intercoder reliability was established by two coders 
independently coding 25% of the transcripts. Using Cohen’s kappa as the agreement statistic, 
reliability for this decision was 0.71 (percent agreement = 78%); again, most disagreements in-
volved one coder missing something, and all  disagreements were readily resolved through 
discussion. This kappa indicates a good level of  agreement (Bakeman & Gottman, 1997). 
 
Results and Discussion 
Mothers’ Reference to Growth 
One research question asked whether mothers mainly referred to certain kinds of changes 
as growth (e.g., increases only, biological changes only) or whether they attributed growth to a 
variety of changes. Inspection of mothers’ talk about growth revealed a clear effect of direction 
in that mothers used the word grow exclusively to refer to events depicting increases in size. To 
explore the effects of domain and age, a 2 (age: 3 years, 41 2 years) x 3 (domain: biological, 
artifact, natural kind) mixed ANOVA was conducted on the number of picture sets per event 
type that mothers discussed as  growth. Each mother received three scores, one for each type 
of event (biological increases, artifact increases, and natural-kind increases). These scores could 
range from 0 (mother did not describe either of the picture sets within a category as growth) to 2 
(mother described both picture sets within a category as growth). 
Although the number of zeros in the data set raised concerns about homogeneity of 
variance, Box’s M test was not significant, therefore indicating stable spread, F(6,8,375) =1.90, p 
5.36. Results revealed a main effect of domain, F(2,33) = 52.16, p<.001, with Tukey’s HSD 
post hoc analyses indicating that mothers talked about growth more often when describing 
biological events than when discussing either artifact or natural-kind events, p<.05 (see Table 2 
for means). In addition, mothers talked about growth more for natural-kind events than for 
artifact events (HSD, p<.05). This finding seems to be driven by the tendency of many mothers to 
refer to crystal accretion as growth. 
[Insert Table 2] 
These comparisons suggest that although mothers tend to concentrate on biological increases in 
size when talking to their young children about growth, they do sometimes discuss nonbiological 
events in terms of growth. Although this study does not speak to whether such nonbiological uses 
influence children’s conceptual understandings, inconsistency in  maternal talk to children may 
complicate the learning process. Next, we look descriptively at the conversations surrounding 
mothers’ nonbiological uses of grow to answer the following question: When mothers talk about 
growth for nonbiological events, do they indicate this may be a different application of the term? 
If so, it is possible that rather than complicating the learning process, flexibility in word use might 
actually be packaged in a context that provides information valuable to conceptual 
development? 
To address this issue, mothers’ description of  nonbiological events as growth events were 
coded to determine whether they indicated they were using grow in an unusual way. Percent 
agreement on this decision by two independent coders was 100%. Results indicate that on 
44% (8 of 18) of the nonbiological items that mothers discussed as  growth, mothers 
qualified their use of the term in their description. It is interesting that all qualified uses of 
grow were for the crystal, suggesting that, for mothers, this event highlighted the conflict between 
everyday language use (in which crystals are often talked about as growing) and the desire to help 
their children understand growth as a biological process. In an example of this kind of 
conversation, one mother explained crystal formation by saying, “It’s kind of a rock that kinda 
grows. It doesn’t really grow because it’s not alive, but it grows because it adds more and more 
of the rock to it.” This mother not only qualified her use of the word grow but also provided 
information about the ontology of crystals (“a kind of rock”) and suggested something about  
the domain specificity of the process of growth (as related to living kinds). Furthermore, this 
mother implicitly introduced the possibility that there may be multiple ways to think about 
the concept of growth, beyond its strict biological meaning. In a similar example, after a 
mother told her child that crystals grow she went on to say “but they’re not  alive but they grow 
anyway.” It will be interesting in future work to test directly whether talking about how 
nonbiological appeals to growth deviate from biological uses helps children have a clearer under-
standing of biological events. 
Mothers’ Explanations 
Biological and artifact items. To explore patterns in mothers’ use of various causal 
mechanisms to describe biological and artifact events, mothers’  explanation scores were 
submitted to a MANOVA as dependent variables. In this MANOVA, child age was a between-
subjects factor, and explanation type, domain, and direction were within-subjects factors. Analyses 
were based on the number of picture sets per event type (biological increases, biological  
decreases, artifact increases, and artifact decreases) for which mothers used each of the three 
explanation categories to explain the depicted change.  Mothers’ mean use of each causal 
explanation is shown in Table 3. 
Inspection of the means and standard deviations in Table 3 raised concerns about 
constrained variance; as a result, the MANOVA was repeated with the data transformed using 
a natural logarithmic transformation (as suggested by Emerson & Soto, 1983). The results 
from the analysis using transformed data replicated the results reported here. The MANOVA 
revealed a significant main effect of domain, F(1,34)=26.44, p<.001, with mothers’ 
offering explanations for more artifact events (M = 3.97) than biological events (M = 1.89). In 
addition, a main effect of explanation type was found, F(2,33) =13.93, p <.001. Tukey’s post 
hoc analyses demonstrated that mothers used other  explanations more than either organic or 
human cause explanations, and human cause explanations more than organic cause 
explanations, p<.05.  
[Insert Table 3] 
Several interactions were also revealed by the analysis. First, explanation type and direction 
interacted, F(2, 33) = 29.30, p < .001. Tukey’s HSD post hoc analyses indicated that mothers used 
organic cause explanations more for increasing events than for decreasing events; however, the 
pattern was reversed for mothers’ use of other explanations, p<.05. Mothers used human 
cause explanations equally for increasing and decreasing events. Domain and direction also 
interacted, F(2, 33) = 5.31, p <.05. When talking about biological changes in size, mothers 
explained more decreasing than increasing events (HSD, p<.05). There was no effect of 
direction of change on mothers’ explanations of artifact events. 
Finally, and most important, explanation type interacted with domain, F(2, 33) 519.97, p 
<.001. When explaining biological events, mothers used organic cause explanations more than 
human cause explanations (HSD, p <.05). For artifact events, mothers used human cause 
explanations more than organic cause explanations (HSD, p <.05). It is interesting that for both 
biological and artifact events, mothers used other explanations more than either of the other 
explanation types (HSD, p<.05). The frequent use of other explanations by mothers  
seemed to center on their tendency to explain  decreasing events with appropriate 
explanations, such as the passing of time for the strawberry and the loss of air for the balloon. 
Natural-kind items. In only nine cases did mothers offer any explanation of a natural-kind 
event. Of these, two were instances in which a mother used an organic cause explanation (once 
each for the crystal and moon). In the remaining seven cases, mothers offered other explanations. 
The following example of a mother talking with her 5-year-old daughter is one of the few cases in 
which an explanation was offered: 
Mother: What happened to the crystal? 
Child:    First somebody watered it and it grew 
and it grew 
Mother: Oh, but a crystal. I don’t think it grew on 
the ground even though it looks green. But they say it’s a crystal so it probably grew 
underground or maybe inside of a rock. It started out with certain chemicals in certain 
combinations like this, and then maybe there was pressure from the top and in certain 
conditions if the chemicals are just right it might start growing like a living thing 
over time. 
In this example, the mother guides her child away from thinking of this as a biological event 
(akin to plant growth) and suggests an explanation more appropriate to the domain (chemical 
reactions). This type of interaction suggests that mothers sometimes talk with children in ways 
that might be helping to support their developing understanding of biology as a separate domain 
with distinct causal mechanisms. Such conversations, however, were relatively rare. Instead of 
explaining natural-kind events, mothers often simply provided brief descriptions (e.g., “It’s 
getting bigger”). This may be because the two natural-kind events included in the book 
depicted relatively complex changes (the waxing of the moon, crystal accretion) that mothers 
may not have felt their children would understand or may not have fully understood 
themselves. 
Summary of Study 1 Findings 
We found that by attending to the ways mothers talk about a variety of events, children 
have opportunities to learn about ontological borders  and domain-specific causal 
mechanisms. Mothers talked about growth exclusively for events in which an object increased 
in size, with an emphasis on biological events. In addition, mothers differentiated between 
biological and artifact events in their use of organic cause and human cause explanations to 
explain events. Furthermore, mothers refrained from using either type of explanation when 
discussing natural-kind events. 
At times, however, mothers did demonstrate domain blurring in their talk to children. 
Close inspection of these cases suggests that mothers often did so in appropriate ways. For 
example, when growth was mentioned outside of the biological context, it tended to be in 
reference to the crystal, a nonbiological case in which increasing size is often described as 
“growth” in adult speech. In addition, when mothers used human cause explanations to discuss 
biological events, they did so exclusively for either the mushroom or the strawberry (e.g., “They 
didn’t give it enough water so it died”). Similarly,  the only biological explanation mothers 
used to explain artifact events was in reference to the sponge expanding because of water. Thus, 
in general, mothers differentiated by type of event in the ways they described and explained 
events, and when they deviated from domain specificity they did so in sensible ways. 
Study 2 
In our second study, we examined preschool  children’s open-ended discussions of 
common events in which a variety of objects change in size with the goal of investigating 
whether and how children distinguish by domain in their reasoning about events. We focused 
on (a) which events children described as growth, and (b) whether  children differentiated 
by domain in the specific causal mechanisms they used to explain change. An important aspect of 
this work is its use of an open-ended questioning strategy, as well as its inclusion of a varied set 
of items (including actual artifact  increases and natural-kind events). Thus, this project extends 
previous work and advances our understanding of children’s emerging biological knowledge. 
This research strategy also allows us to look at the ways children discuss events from different 
domains in light of the way the same events were discussed by mothers in Study 1. 
Method 
Participants 
Thirty-two children from three child care centers located in a coastal region of central 
California participated. The sample was evenly divided into two age groups: a 3-year-old group 
(M = 3 years, 2 months; range= 2 years, 8 months to 4 years, 1 month) and a 5-year-old 
group (M = 5 years, 0 months; range= 4 years, 5 months to 5 years, 9 months). Each age 
group consisted of an equal number of boys and girls. The majority of the  children were 
from middle-income, European American backgrounds. 
Materials 
Fifteen picture sets depicting physical change-of state events were used. As in Study 1, each 
picture set consisted of a sequence of three pictures  depicting a physical change-of-state 
event. Twelve of the picture sets showed sequences of increases and decreases in size across 
two domains: biological kinds and artifacts. Three additional picture sets depicting the actual 
and apparent increase in size of nonliving natural-kind objects were also included. (Note that 
whereas in Study 1 mothers saw two events of each type, children in this study saw three 
events.) See Table 1 for specific items. 
Procedure 
All sessions were conducted by the same researcher in a quiet area of each preschool and 
were audiotaped. Each child participated individually in a single session of testing. Children 
viewed all 15 picture sets in one of three random orders, with the only constraint on the orders 
being that no more than two picture sets of the same type (e.g.,  biological increase) could 
appear consecutively. 
While pointing to the pictures one at a time, the researcher said: “Here is a picture of a 
(object name),’’ then, “Here is another picture of the (object name) that was taken later on,’’ and 
finally, “Here is one last picture of that (object name) that was taken even later on.” Although the 
majority of the picture sets depicted changes of state of common items, object labels were 
provided to ensure that children knew what the pictures represented. Furthermore, for all items 
the phrases later on and even later on were given vocal emphasis to accentuate the idea that 
each picture in a set was of the same object changing over time. Young children’s ability to  
comprehend the chronological order of the picture sets is supported by previous research 
demonstrating that by 3 years of age children understand and can construct three-picture 
sequences of familiar events (Fivush & Mandler, 1985; Gelman, Bullock, & Meck,1980). If, 
however, a child began to discuss an event in reverse order, the experimenter corrected the child 
by reminding him or her of which picture was first in the sequence. 
Following the presentation of each picture set, the researcher asked each child three questions: 
(a) “What happened to the (object name)?” (b) “How  did it (word used by the child)?” and (c) 
“Why did it (word used by child)?” For example, if a child  answered “What happened to the 
duck?” by saying “It grew,’’ the experimenter would ask, “How did it grow?” and “Why did it 
grow?” If a child did not use a change-of-state verb in his or her description (e.g., “It’s a baby 
duck, then a kid duck, then a mommy duck.”), the experimenter asked, “How did it change 
like that?” and “Why did it change like that?” This questioning strategy was designed not  only 
to elicit a description of the event but also to encourage children to talk about the specific causal 
mechanisms responsible for the change. 
Coding 
Reference to growth. Using transcripts of the sessions, two coders independently coded all 
uses of the word grow (or variations) to determine  whether the term was actually being 
used to describe the depicted event. As in Study 1, we focused exclusively on instances in 
which children were judged to describe the depicted event as a growth event (e.g., “[The 
sponge] growed and growed”), as opposed to talking about unpictured aspects of the event 
occurring either before or after the depicted change (e.g., “[The flower] just grew then it got 
dead”), or talking about the event in  reverse order (e.g., “[The fish] was a baby then grew up to 
be a daddy”) Agreement for determining  which utterances constituted a description of the 
event was 90%. Disagreements tended to be due to one coder missing an aspect of the utterance, 
such as when one coder judged a child to be describing the flower as growing when the other 
coder noted that the child seemed to be explaining the picture sets in reverse order. All 
disagreements were resolved through discussion. 
Explanations. Children’s explanations of picture sets were coded to investigate whether 
children explained events from different domains in distinct ways. The coding categories for 
Study 2 were identical to those described in Study 1: organic cause, human cause, other, 
and no explanation. Intercoder reliability was established by two coders independently coding 
25% of the transcripts. Using Cohen’s kappa as the agreement statistic, reliability for this decision 
was .77 (percent agreement = 81%), with all disagreements resolved through discussion. 
Results and Discussion 
Children’s Reference to Growth 
A parallel research question to the first one  explored in Study 1 asks whether children 
mainly referred to increases in size of biological items as growth or whether they described a 
variety of changes in terms of growth. It is important to  emphasize that when children 
simply describe a change as a growth event this does not necessarily tell us whether they have 
an understanding of the specific processes involved in biological growth. This analysis does, 
however, help us to identify whether children differentiate by domain in terms of the events they 
are willing to describe as growth. If children’s understanding of growth is indeed a core 
component of children’s biological theory (as has  been suggested in the literature; e.g., 
Inagaki & Hatano, 1996), it is necessary to examine the  situations for which children 
spontaneously invoke this concept. 
In contrast to mothers who only talked about increases in size as growth, children in this 
study talked about both increasing and decreasing events as growth. As a result, two sets of 
analysis were necessary. The first analysis investigated children’s descriptions of the increase and 
decrease in size of biological and artifact items. The second analysis examined children’s 
descriptions of the increase in size of biological, artifact, and natural-kind items. 
Biological and artifact items. A 2 (age: 3 years, 5 years) x 2 (domain: biological, artifact) x 2 
(direction: increasing, decreasing) mixed ANOVA was conducted on the number of picture 
sets that children described in terms of growth. In this  ANOVA, age was a between-
subjects factor, and domain and direction were within-subjects factors. The mean number of 
picture sets (by event type) that 3- and 5-year-old children identified as growth is shown in the 
first two columns of Table 4. Note that children’s means are based on three items of each type, 
whereas in Study 1 mothers only saw two items of each type. 
As in earlier analyses, inspection of the means and standard deviations raised concerns about 
constrained variance. Therefore, the ANOVA was repeated with the data transformed using a 
natural logarithmic transformation [ln(1 1dv)] to stabilize spread. The results reported are 
those from the original ANOVA that were replicated by the analysis using transformed data. 
The ANOVA showed significant main effects in the predicted directions for domain and 
direction, F(1, 30) = 31.84, p <.001 and F(1, 30) = 79.32, p <.001, respectively. In addition, the 
Direction x Domain interaction was significant, F(1, 30) = 31.88, p <.001. Tukey’s HSD post hoc 
analysis of this interaction indicates that children referred to growth more for events in which a 
biological object increased in size than for any other type of event, p<.05. 
[Insert Table 4] 
To explore further the kinds of changes that  children might be willing to describe as 
growth, we next look at children’s reasoning about three  additional events depicting the 
increase in size of nonliving natural-kind objects (a popcorn kernel popping, the waxing of 
the moon, and crystal accretion). These items are interesting because they are similar to 
biological items in that they are natural, yet they are also similar to human-made artifacts in 
that they are not alive. In addition, the mechanisms of change are likely to be unfamiliar to 
children. Investigating the ways children label these events, then, may provide additional insight 
into the kinds of events children are willing to describe as growth. 
Biological, artifact, and natural-kind items. The significance of the difference among children’s 
talk about growth for biological, artifact, and natural-kind increasing events was compared in a 
2 (age: 3 years, 5 years) x 3 (domain: biological, artifact, natural kind) mixed ANOVA on 
the number of picture sets per event type which children referred to as growth. Because the Box’s 
M test for homogeneity of variance was significant, F(6,6520)  = 2.23, p =.037, we conducted 
a second analysis using data transformed logarithmically to stabilize spread (as described earlier). 
The Box’s M test from the analysis using transformed data was not significant (p =.08), suggesting 
that the transformation successfully stabilized the spread. The transformed data wholly 
supported the findings from the original ANOVA, which are reported next. 
Results indicate an overall effect of domain, F(2,29)=22.61, p<.001, with post hoc analyses 
showing that children referred to growth more for biological events than for either artifact or 
natural-kind events (HSD, p<.05). Unlike mothers, children did not differentiate between artifact 
and natural-kind events in their reference to growth. No effects of age were indicated by the 
analysis. 
Despite children’s general domain-specific tendency, there were a number of instances in 
which children labeled nonbiological events as growth. In most instances children used grow in 
nonbiological contexts without any indication that this might be unusual (e.g., The sponge 
“grew”). At other times, children were more specific about their application of the term 
(e.g.,“[The moon] kept growing  like people grow” or “[The building] grew, just like 
plants!”). A few children, however, seemed to be struggling with the boundary between 
things that increase in size by “growing” and things that  increase in size for other reasons. For 
example, one 3-year-old child said of the crystal, “They kept  growing bigger and bigger. ... I 
don’t really know how crystals might grow. I really don’t know. It’s so funny to me that crystals 
can grow.” In this example, the child seems to appreciate that crystals may not be among the 
kinds of things that grow, yet is unable to think of an alternative way to describe the event. Unlike 
mothers in Study 1, however, none of the children in this study clearly qualified their use of 
grow for nonbiological events. 
The preceding examples suggest that children vary in whether they think of growth as a 
specifically biological event. To better assess what children understand about the relationship 
between growth and biological kinds, it is necessary to look more closely at the explanations 
they provide for events occurring in different domains. For example,  although some 
children might be willing to talk about nonbiological events as growth, they might not explain 
these events in terms of biological causal mechanisms. The following example illustrates this point 
nicely: 
Experimenter: Can you tell me what happened to the sponge? 
Child: It grew. 
Experimenter: How did it grow? 
Child: I don’t know how sponges grow  
but I’ll tell you how I think they grow. I think they just got pictures of them 
farther away. This one was so far away; this one was kinda, teeny bit close up; 
this one was much close up. 
Even though this 5-year-old child describes the event as growth, her explanation is clearly 
non-biological. The next section systematically examines the causal mechanisms children used to 
explain the depicted changes. 
Children’s Explanations 
Biological and artifact items. In addition to differentiating by domain in the events children 
described as growth, we asked whether children also differentiated by domain in the causal 
mechanisms they used to explain changes in different domains.  Patterns in children’s use of 
the three explanation categories (organic cause, human cause, other) were investigated using 
data analysis techniques similar to those described in Study 1. Analyses were based on the 
number of picture sets per event type  (biological increases, biological decreases, artifact 
increases, and artifact decreases) for which children used each of the explanation categories to 
describe the depicted change. All causal explanation types were considered to be dependent 
measures with scores ranging from 0 (child did not use the given explanation to describe any of 
the picture sets within a category) to 3 (child described all of the picture sets within a category with 
that explanation). These scores were submitted to a multivariate analysis of variance in which age 
was a between-subjects factor and explanation type, domain, and direction were within-
subjects factors. 
Results of this analysis show a significant Box’s M test for homogeneity of variance, F(78, 
2,842) 5 1.35, p 5.022; therefore, we conducted a second analysis using the logarithmic data 
transformation described for previous analyses [ln(1 1dv)]. Transforming the data successfully 
stabilized spread, as evidence by a nonsignificant result for the Box’s M test (p 5.10). Unless 
noted, the transformed data supported the findings from the original analysis, which are  
reported next. 
The analysis revealed a multivariate effect of age such that 5-year-old children offered more 
explanations than did 3-year-old children, F(1, 30) 512.44, p 5.001. On average, 5-year-old 
children explained 10.81 events whereas younger children explained 6.88 events (of 12). A main 
effect of explanation type was also found, with children offering human cause explanations on 
more picture sets (M 5 3.91) than either organic cause (M 5 2.22) or other explanations (M 5 
2.72), p <.05, by Tukey’s HSD post hoc test. In addition, the analysis revealed several significant 
multivariate interactions. The following two-way interactions were significant: Age x Domain 
(significant in the analysis using transformed data only), F(1, 30) 5 5.28, p <.05; Explanation 
Type x Domain, F(2,29) 5 40.90, p <.001; Explanation Type x Direct ion,  
F(2,29)511.77,  p<.001;  and Domain x Direction, F(1, 30) 5 8.72, p <.01. These interactions 
were not analyzed further as they are  qualified by the significant three-way interactions of 
which they are a part. 
First, the analysis revealed an interaction among explanation type, domain, and direction, 
F(2,29) 5 7.20, p <.01 (see Table 5 for means). Post hoc analysis of this interaction revealed that 
when explaining biological events, children used organic cause explanation to explain more 
increasing than decreasing events (HSD, p <.05). They did not differentiate by direction in their 
use of human cause or other explanations. When explaining the change in size of artifacts, 
children’s use of each explanation type was equal for increasing and decreasing events. 
T h e  M A N O V A  a l s o  r e v e a l e d  a n  A g e  x  Explanation Type x Domain interaction, F(2, 
29) 5 4.23, p <.05. Tukey’s HSD post hoc analyses indicate that although 3-year-old children 
demonstrated equal use of the three explanation types when explaining biological events, 
they explained more artifact events with human cause and other explanations than with organic 
cause explanations, p<.05 (see Figure 1). In contrast to 3-year-olds, 5-year-old children 
emphasized organic cause and other explanations over human cause explanations when 
describing biological events. In addition, 5-year-old children used human cause explanations more 
than either biological or other explanations when explaining artifact events, p <.05 (see Figure 2). 
Natural-kind items. This section compares children’s explanations of biological and artifact 
increases to the causes they used to explain natural-kind increases in size (moon, crystal, 
popcorn). In contrast to mothers in Study 1, children often used biological, human cause, and 
other explanations to explain natural-kind events, explaining 65% of the natural-kind events 
with at least one type of explanation (mothers only explained 12.5% of natural-kind 
events). In the following analysis, we explored whether children explained natural-kind events 
with causal mechanisms usually associated with biological growth (e.g., organic cause), with 
causes associated with artifact change (e.g., human cause), or in some other way. 
[Insert Table 5] 
[Insert Figure 1 and 2] 
Children’s explanations of natural-kind events were compared with their explanations of 
biological and artifact increases with an Age x Explanation Type x Domain MANOVA. Analyses 
were based on the number of picture sets for which children used each of the explanation 
categories to describe the depicted changes. Thus, each child received three scores (ranging 
from 0 to 3) for each of the three types of picture set (biological increase, artifact increase, 
natural-kind increase). 
A main effect of age revealed that 5-year-old children explained more events than did 3-
year-old children, F(1, 30) =15.55, p <.001. In addition, explanation type and domain interacted, 
F(4,27) = 27.08, p<.001, as did age, explanation type, and domain, F(4,27) = 5.29, p<.001.Post 
hoc analysis of the three-way interaction revealed results that  replicated the patterns of 
findings for biological and artifact events indicated in the previous analysis. With regard to 
the question of how children explained natural-kind events, this analysis indicated that neither 
3-year-old nor 5-year-old children emphasized any of the three explanation types when explaining 
natural-kind events. 
Summary of Study 2 Findings 
At the onset of this work we reasoned that  preschool children might initially 
understand growth to refer generally to increases in size, and later narrow down their 
concept of growth to include only biological increases. The results presented here, however, 
suggest that children in this study did not interpret growth as simply  meaning “gets 
bigger.” Instead, they primarily  identified events in which biological objects increased in 
size as growth. This set of findings extends previous work in that children were shown to 
exhibit evidence of domain specificity even when asked to reason about events in which 
nonbiological objects actually get bigger, rather than about impossible increases (as in earlier 
studies). There were, however, indications that children at both ages were still refining their 
understandings. Specifically, both 3- and 5-year-old children sometimes described nonbiological 
increasing events in terms of growth. 
Investigation of children’s explanations of events supports the idea that children also begin to 
develop domain-specific causal understandings by the preschool years, and that these 
understandings are refined over time. Although children at both ages emphasized human cause 
explanations over organic cause explanations for artifact events, only 5-yearold children also 
emphasized organic cause explanations over human cause explanations for biological events. 
Children in both age groups used all of the explanation types equally for natural-kind events, 
perhaps suggesting that they were unsure of the most appropriate ways to explain events in 
this domain. 
General Discussion 
In these studies, we investigated young children’s understanding of events in which biological 
and nonbiological objects change size, and how parents may help children learn to distinguish by 
domain in their reasoning about such events. Findings from these studies suggest  that by 
the preschool  years, children already know a great deal about  biological and nonbiological 
change-in-size events. Furthermore, mothers may play a role in guiding children’s 
understanding of domain differences. Next, we discuss in greater depth the impli cations 
of our findings, with an emphasis on  highlighting both consistencies and inconsistencies in 
the ways children and mothers talked about  events. 
Understanding of Growth as a Biological Event 
In Study 1, our interest was in asking whether mothers distinguish between biological and 
non-biological events in their conversations with children. One of our goals was to examine 
which events mothers labeled as growth, as this concept may be central to children’s developing 
understanding of biology as an autonomous domain (Inagaki & Hatano, 1996). This is a 
meaningful research question as patterns in adult speech to children might influence children’s 
conceptual understandings (see Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1997). Results indicated that although 
mothers concentrated their talk about growth on biological increases in size, they also 
occasionally talked about nonbiological events in terms of growth. Mothers’ references to 
growth in nonbiological contexts, however, were consistent with social conventions regarding 
use of the word grow. 
That mothers in this study occasionally used growth outside of the biological context 
highlights the fact that natural language is often imprecise and ambiguous, resting on social 
conventions rather than semantic facts. If, as we argue, mother–child conversations are an 
important context for the negotiation of theory-relevant understandings, it becomes 
important to consider the impact of non-biological uses of grow on children’s understandings. On 
the one hand, this kind of flexible use could confuse children as they negotiate the connection 
between their theories of biology and the concept of growth. On the other hand, children may 
attend primarily to what is most consistent in mother talk (i.e., that growth applies to biological 
events) and may disregard other (nonbiological) uses. It is  important to point out that 
children do not always have to solve this puzzle on their own. Some mothers in this study 
included information in their language that may have helped their children  interpret 
nonbiological references to growth, for instance, by explaining how their use of grow for the 
crystal differs from more typical uses. Such conversations, although admittedly infrequent 
in our data, may be contexts that are particularly  helpful to children as they begin to 
recognize the conflict between apparent growth and actual biological growth. 
Study 2 results indicated that, like mothers,  children focused their use of grow on 
biological events in which an object increased in size. Also like mothers, children occasionally 
described nonbiological events as growth. The contexts within which mothers and children 
referenced grow, however, differed. Mothers’ reference to growth in nonbiological contexts 
could be seen as consistent with social conventions (i.e., primarily restricted to the crystal), whereas 
children talked about a variety of events as growth, including biological and artifact increases 
and decreases, and natural-kind increases. 
It is unclear what these nonbiological uses of grow indicate about conceptual understandings. 
One possibility is that speakers who use grow outside of the biological realm have an 
incomplete understanding of the domain-specific nature of growth. A second possibility is that they 
are confused about the ontology of specific items (e.g., they believe that crystals are alive). 
Finally, some speakers who talked about nonbiological events in terms of growth may be aware 
that growth is a biological event and may know which items are biological. Such speakers 
may be demonstrating an appreciation for the  multiple meanings of growth apparent in 
everyday language use. We suspect that mothers fall into the latter category, whereas children fall 
into one of the two previous categories. 
One approach to considering these possibilities is to look more closely at how grow is used 
outside of the biological realm. For instance, do particular items elicit descriptions that 
reference growth? This was certainly the case in Study 1. Of the 18 cases in which mothers used 
grow to describe a nonbiological event, 14 were for the crystal. This finding is  interesting in 
that crystal accretion is often called growth by both lay people and scientists and  “crystal-
growing kits” are found in many toy stores. Thus, mothers’ use of grow for this event may be a 
reflection of accepted word usage and not necessarily an indication that they are unaware that 
growth is most commonly used to describe a specific  biological event (nor is it likely to be 
an indication that they believe crystals to be alive). In Study 2, however, children talked about 
growth for a much wider variety of events, suggesting that their understanding of the concept is 
broader than that of mothers and may not be based on an understanding of conventional word 
use. 
The current data do not allow us to establish whether children’s flexible use of grow is 
due to ontological confusion or an incomplete understanding that grow is predominantly used 
to refer to biological increases in size. However, it is likely that, even within a single age group, 
individual differences will be apparent in children’s conceptual understandings. For example, in 
our data we found that some individuals adhered to strict domain distinctions, whereas others 
were more fluid in their use of grow. Specifically, two 3-year-old children and one 5-year-old child 
identified all three biological events as growth (and none of the other events). The majority of 
children, however, demonstrated variable patterns in their use of grow. Longitudinal work that 
tracks the progression of individual children’s understanding of theory-laden concepts would be 
helpful in attempts to clarify the likely source of domain blurring. It would not be surprising to 
see such an investigation reveal a nonlinear relationship between age and children’s reference to 
growth for nonbiological events (possibly a U-shaped curve). Future researchers might also wish 
to collect data on children’s ontological distinctions. 
Overall, however, the findings from these studies suggest that both mothers and children 
appreciate that the most common use of the word grow is to describe biological increases in 
size. This result is consistent with the Rosengren et al. (1991) finding that by 3 years of age 
children differentiated between animals and artifacts in their decisions about the 
possibility for growth (see also Backsheider et al., 1993). In addition to supporting earlier 
findings, the current study enhances our understanding of children’s reasoning about growth 
by showing that children differentiate by domain even when confronted with a wide variety 
of actual changes. In contrast to earlier work, children in this study were asked to discuss 
possible artifact  increases (e.g., a beachball being blown up) rather than impossible artifact 
increases (e.g., a chair getting larger). Second, children were asked to discuss the increase 
in size of nonliving natural kinds. This last event type was included to explore whether children 
considered growth to be a specifically biological event or whether they might  consider it to 
be a natural event that appropriately describes the increase in size of both living and nonliving 
natural kinds. Therefore, our study required children to make judgments about real-world events 
with similar perceptual appearances (but different causes) that occurred in several domains. 
Even when this additional layer of complexity was added, children were remarkably domain 
specific in their use of grow to describe events. 
The conclusion that children recognize growth to be a primarily biological event is further 
reinforced by several studies that have reached the same conclusion with varying 
methodologies. Previous work has examined children’s reasoning about  changes occurring 
in a variety of domains through the use of forced-choice tasks. Although forced-choice tasks 
tend to be more carefully controlled, they may not thoroughly reveal how children  
themselves think about events. In the current study, we used an open-ended interview to 
explore children’s descriptions and explanations of change. In allowing children to be 
unconstrained in their description of events, we found that they often mentioned growth and 
did so primarily for events in which a biological object increased in size. Thus, by replicating 
previous findings with a converging methodology, we can more confidently claim that 
preschool children recognize growth to be a domain-specific process in which a biological object 
increases in size. 
Knowledge of Domain-Specific Causal Mechanisms 
Data on patterns of word use alone may be  insufficient to evaluate the nature of one’s 
understandings. As Keil and Silberstein (1996) have argued, “We can’t fully characterize 
how concepts are represented without also characterizing the larger systems of explanation in 
which they are embedded” (p. 630). Thus, in addition to examining mothers’ and children’s 
mentions of growth, a second line of inquiry examined the causal mechanisms used to explain 
change. Because we predicted that mother– child conversations might be a context for children’s 
developing understanding of biology as a distinct domain, we looked for evidence that 
mothers modeled the use of domain-specific causal mechanisms. We then explored whether 
children differentiated by domain in the ways they explained events. 
Our findings indicate that mothers clearly favored specific causal mechanisms for events 
occurring in different domains. They explained artifact events with human cause 
explanations, and biological events with organic cause explanations. Neither explanation 
type was used to explain natural-kind events, which often went unexplained. These findings are 
particularly interesting as, as Coley (2000) pointed out, there is currently very little research 
available on adults’ conceptions of biological and nonbiological events. Although not 
specifically aimed at responding to this deficit, these findings advance our knowledge in the 
area. 
In our analysis of the Study 2 data, we found evidence for a developmental influence on 
children’s conceptual understandings. In particular, whereas 5- year-old children demonstrated 
causal understandings similar to that of mothers, 3-year-old children did not demonstrate 
domain-specific causal reasoning to the same extent. Instead, 3-year-olds evidenced domain-
specific causal understandings for artifact events only, explaining these events primarily with 
human cause explanations. For biological events, 3-year-old children used biological and 
human cause explanations equally. Children at both ages seemed unsure of appropriate 
explanations for natural-kind events, using biological, human cause, and other explanations 
equally. In contrast to mothers, though, children often made an attempt to explain these 
events, explaining 65% of events in this domain (as compared with 13% for mothers). 
That even 3-year-old children had begun to make domain distinctions indicates an early 
appreciation that events occurring in different domains are likely to be due to different causes. For 
instance, children’s early understanding of domain specificity in explanatory frameworks is 
illustrated in an example in which a 3-year-old child described the increase in size of the 
moon by saying, “It grew big.” When asked how that happened, the child replied, “The 
food,’’ and then went on to laugh and say, “I’m  funny.” The child in this example seems to 
understand that food is important for growth, yet  recognizes the humor in trying to apply 
this knowledge to his assertion that the moon grew. Incidentally, this example also 
demonstrates that when given opportunities to talk about events in a  spontaneous way, 
children may reveal aspects of their understandings that researchers might not  think to ask 
about in more structured paradigms. 
In conclusion, in children’s everyday lives they  are likely to encounter a variety of events in 
which an object changes in size. In addition, children are likely to consider these events in the 
company of others. In the present studies, we aimed to increase our understanding of how 
children reason about diverse events, and whether conversations with mothers may 
contribute to children’s understandings. Our findings support and extend current work 
suggesting that children construct theories that  divide the world into distinct domains with 
distinct causal mechanisms. Furthermore, beyond simply documenting children’s understandings, 
this work begins to explore one context in which children may have opportunities to develop their 
understandings. Although mothers in this study did not offer  elaborate explanations of all 
events, they did explain many events and did so in domain-specific ways. Our results are 
similar to those of Gelman et al. (1998) in that mothers did not always take advantage of 
opportunities to explain events to their children. We agree with Gelman et al. in arguing that there 
are several subtle things that mothers do that may, in fact, be informative for children (e.g., 
domain-specific application of growth, discussion of ambiguous cases). Thus, the results of this 
work encourage us to keep open the possibility that mother–child conversation may be an 
important source of  information for children as they negotiate their  developing theories 
of the world. This finding provides a foundation for future work investigating whether and 
how children use the information provided by mothers about everyday events. 
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